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Dennis Mueller's Constitutional Democracy and Robert Cooter's
The Strategic Constitution have been written to fill a great need for
basic general textbooks on the economic analysis of constitutional
structures. These books aim to provide a general framework for ana-
lyzing how new constitutional structures might affect the conduct of
politicians and the performance of government. Research in this area
is new and growing rapidly. So it is exciting to find in these two books
the first bold efforts to synthesize and present the new analytical
methodology at a level suitable for an advanced undergraduate
course.
But these efforts must be called bold because, in this rapidly
growing research area, there is not yet much consensus about the basic
organizing paradigms and principles of political economics. So it is
perhaps inevitable that these books will inspire controversy and criti-
cism, as other scholars such as myself find that our favorite topics have
been neglected. Yet the only way that we can arrive at a consensus
about these organizing principles is through the writing of books such
as these, where the authors do the work of trying to organize our new
field, each building on the strengths and critiques of earlier efforts.
Thus, although I find shortcomings in these books, I want to advocate
the importance of their political questions and the appropriateness of
their economic methodology.
In Part I of this essay, I introduce some of the basic questions of
constitutional analysis and show the importance of work in this area
as one of the major new developments in social theory. In Part II, I
explain why the methods of economic theory are particularly appro-
priate and useful for such constitutional analysis. In Part III, I try to
follow Cooter and Mueller in sketching some of the most important
results of economic analysis of constitutional structures, but I find my
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perspective is quite different from theirs. Part IV concludes with an-
ticipation of more work in this area.
I. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
The importance of a democratic political system for promoting
social welfare has been a fundamental axiom of American politics
throughout the history of our republic, and it is probably the most
widely accepted tenet of political philosophy in the world today. We
believe that popular participation in political processes, making a gov-
ernment of the people and by the people, is necessary as a precondi-
tion to make government for the people. There is, however, an enor-
mous variety of possible constitutional structures for democratic sys-
tems, including different presidential and parliamentary forms with a
wide range of different electoral systems. Understanding the estab-
lishment of a democracy to be so fundamentally important for any so-
ciety, we should also understand that the choice among different forms
of democracy is a matter of great potential importance that deserves
serious concern and study. There should be great efforts to learn more
about how democratic constitutional structures may affect the con-
duct of politicians and the performance of government. And yet the
analytical study of comparative constitutional structures has been of-
ten neglected in the teaching and research of political science depart-
ments around the world.
Real practical need for such understanding arises whenever the
structure of a constitution is in question. In constitutional law, argu-
ments that extend and modify our interpretation of constitutional
provisions should be evaluated with a concern for understanding how
different constitutional structures may affect social welfare. But it is in
the processes of creating new constitutions and amending existing
constitutions that we find the most urgent need for a better under-
standing of the potential impact of different constitutional structures.
This need is illustrated in Mueller's Chapter 21, where he surveys
the results of various conventions and commissions that have drafted
new constitutions in recent years. In country after country, he finds
that the constitutional structure of government has been designed not
for the long-term welfare of the society, but for the short-term inter-
ests of the politicians who controlled the constitutional commission or
convention. Thus, we typically find parliamentary systems with pro-
portional representation in countries where the constitutional com-
mission was dominated by leaders of many small parties, and we typi-
cally find strong presidential systems in countries where the constitu-
tional commission was controlled by supporters of the strongest can-
didate for the first presidential election. It is not surprising that, given
the lack of objective academic expertise, the principal voices in consti-
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tutional debates are those of professional politicians, whose constitu-
tional preferences depend mostly on their perceptions of how the po-
litical game might be best restructured to their own short-term advan-
tage.
To see the role that academic expertise should play in constitu-
tional debates, it may be useful to compare the impact of economic
theory on the great tariff debates of international trade. In these de-
bates about tariff protection versus free trade, economic analysis has
served not to definitively prove the superiority of free trade, but to as-
sure that the welfare consequences of tariff policies for broad groups
of unfocused citizens should be considered along with the concerns of
active special interest groups. So also economic analysis of constitu-
tional structures should serve not to prove that any one constitutional
structure is optimal, but to expand the scope of public constitutional
debates by offering more perspectives on how a change in the rules of
the political game may affect rational political behavior and the re-
sulting performance of democratic government for the welfare of its
citizens.
A democratic constitution specifies the political offices of the
government, the powers that are associated with these offices, and the
procedures by which the holders of these offices are to be selected. As
such, the constitution should be viewed as the rules of the game by
which politicians gain and use power. (Many countries may list the
rules of their electoral system in documents of organic law rather than
in a formal constitutional document, but for analytical purposes it is
better to consider the electoral system as an integral part of a demo-
cratic constitution.) These rules can affect the rational behavior of
politicians subtly but pervasively, with great potential impact on the
quality of government.
To get a start in constitutional analysis, we may begin by trying to
define some broad categories of constitutional structures. At least two
broad categorical distinctions are widely recognized. First, there is the
distinction between presidential democracies in which the chief execu-
tive or head of state is popularly elected, and parliamentary democra-
cies in which the chief executive is chosen by the elected legislature.
Second (as Mueller emphasizes in Chapters 8-10), there is the distinc-
tion between proportional representation systems in which legislative
seats are allocated in multimember districts where minorities can get
representation, and majoritarian systems like plurality voting in which
each legislative seat is allocated in an election where a majority candi-
date wins all. Grouping nations in a simple two-by-two grid according
to these categories, we may look for systematic differences in political
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behavior across categories.! In general, proportional representation
tends to yield more political parties than plurality voting,2 and parlia-
mentary systems tend to have more disciplined parties than presiden-
tial systems. Advantages and disadvantages have been found in each
of these categories: unpredictable and unstable coalition formation in
multiparty parliamentary systems with proportional representation, an
inflexible limitation of alternatives in two-party parliamentary systems
with plurality voting, and a potential for divided government and
gridlock in presidential systems.
Such a broad two-by-two categorization is much too simple, how-
ever. There are many forms of proportional representation, and there
are many other majoritarian voting rules besides simple plurality vot-
ing. Shugart and Carey have shown that the powers of the president
(executive control, legislative veto powers, constitutional powers to
call new elections) can be very different in different presidential de-
mocracies, and these differences may be associated with systematically
different patterns of political behavior. Parliamentary systems may
also differ in their legislative procedures, and in their rules for forming
and dissolving governments and calling new elections.
Furthermore, we can imagine a wide range of hybrid schemes
that mix elements across these categories. Germany and Russia today
have electoral systems that use both plurality voting and proportional
representation in the same legislative chamber. The Weimar constitu-
tion of Germany and the constitution of France's Fifth Republic are
well known examples of attempts to define semi-presidential systems,
with the hope of combining the best aspects of both presidential and
parliamentary systems. But without any theory of how constitutional
structures affect political behavior, how can we be sure that such a
I Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The size and scope of government: Comparative
politics with rationalpoliticians, 43 Eur Econ Rev 699 (1999).
2 Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants
of Electoral Systems 64 (Yale 1989).
3 Daniel Diermeier and Tunothy J. Feddersen, Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of
Confidence Procedure, 92 Am Pol Sci Rev 611 (1998); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M.
Carey, Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge
1992); Gary W. Cox, The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the development of political parties in
Wrictorian England 21-87 (Cambridge 1987).
4 Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds, The Failure of Presidential Democracy (Johns
Hopkins 1994); Arend Lijphart, ed, Parliamentary versus Presidential Government (Oxford
1992).
5 Roger B. Myerson, Theoretical comparisons of electoral systems, 43 Eur Econ Rev 671,
673-75 (1999); Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count. Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral
Systems 20-23 (Cambridge 1997); Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes at 20-22 (cited in note
2).
6 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies at 148-66 (cited in note 3).
7 Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets
and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies 279-81 (Cambridge 1996).
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new hybrid system is not actually combining the worst aspects of
presidential and parliamentary systems?
There are many other dimensions on which constitutional struc-
tures may differ. Politics in a centralized unitary republic can be dif-
ferent from a federal republic where regional governments are guar-
anteed some degree of autonomy from central control. Constitutions
can also differ in rules for plebiscites, and in the relative timing of
elections to various levels of government. Provisions for selecting
judges may be different in different countries. Declarations of individ-
ual rights that are protected by courts of law may reduce the powers
of elected officials and increase the powers of courts. Finally, the rules
for amending the constitution and for adjudicating constitutional dis-
putes must also be counted as critical aspects of any constitutional sys-
tem.
Together these constitutional structures define the rules of the
political game. A political economist applies game theory to see how
changes in any part of this political game may affect rational behavior
in all of its parts.
II. APPLYING ECONOMIC ANALYSIS TO POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
I should be careful to avoid some possible confusion about the
meaning of the word "economic" as I use it here. When I speak of
economic analysis of political institutions, I do not mean to suggest an
exclusive focus on how political institutions affect the marketplace
where goods are allocated. For me, "economic analysis of political in-
stitutions" means studying political institutions by the methods for
analysis of competitive behavior that economists have developed. In
this sense, I am applying a definition of economics which could be
viewed as relatively new or as quite ancient.
The term "economics" was first used by philosophers of ancient
Greece who were interested in studying all the institutions of civilized
society and did not develop an academic specialization in the study of
markets alone. But in the time of Adam Smith, economic theory first
achieved a higher level of formal analytical rigor by using the linear
algebra of prices and quantities that characterize the production and
consumption of material goods, and this mathematical methodology in
turn encouraged economists to define their field in terms of a focus on
markets for material goods. Then in the nineteenth and early twenti-
eth centuries, there was a long movement to identify the determinants
of market transactions in rational individual decisionmaking. Follow-
ing the success of this movement, the question of how to extend such
rational choice analysis to more general social situations was taken up
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by the early game theorists.8 Now, with the success of game theory as a
complement to price theory in economic analysis, economists can de-
fine their field more broadly as being about the analysis of incentives
in all social institutions. Thus, economic theorists have returned to the
breadth of vision that characterized the ancient Greek social philoso-
phers who gave economics its name.
This expansion in the scope of economic analysis has naturally
caused some concern among political scientists who are uncomfort-
able with rational choice analysis. Rigorous rational choice analysis
can be difficult, because the impact of one person's decisions on an-
other person's incentives can be quite subtle. Some critics like Cohn9
have depicted political economics as a perverse academic plot to re-
place political scientists who care about real political phenomena with
political economists who merely excel in a complex analytical meth-
odology. But intrinsic complexity actually tends to inhibit the aca-
demic penetration of any new analytical methodology, because stu-
dents are less willing to devote the time required to master a more dif-
ficult subject (in this case by reading a rather technical book like Gib-
bons or Osborne and Rubinstein' °) unless its value can be proven. Fur-
thermore, mastery of a difficult analytical methodology does not pre-
clude a scholar from caring about real political phenomena as much as
others who would offer their political opinions without support from
any rigorous analytical methodology.
Other critics of political economics, like Herzog," are concerned
because the validity of the rational choice assumption often 'seems
questionable. Certainly people in real life are often foolish or inconsis-
tent in ways that violate the economic assumptions of rationality. So
why should we persist in assuming such perfect rationality of indi-
viduals in our economic models? The answer follows from our mission
of understanding the institutions of civilized society.
Economic analysis has been developed to provide a methodology
for evaluating proposals to reform social institutions. Institutional re-
forms are generally advocated with the goal of improving the people's
welfare in a society, and so any methodology for evaluating proposed
reforms must involve some concept of welfare, that is, of what people
want in their lives. The economist then assumes that reforming an in-
stitution will not change the fundamentals of what people want, and
8 Roger B. Myerson, Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory, 37 J Econ Lit
1067 (1999).
9 Jonathan Cohn, Irrational Exuberance: When did political science forget about politics?,
The New Republic 25 (Oct 25,1999).
10 Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein, A Course in Game Theory (MIT 1994); Robert
Gibbons, Game Theory for Applied Economists (Princeton 1992).
11 Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U Chi L Rev 895 (2000).
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that each person in society will act individually to increase his own
welfare as much as possible for him within the bounds of his social
situation. The assumption that changing institutional rules does not
change people's fundamental preferences is needed to give us a com-
mon scale on which different institutions can be compared (and it
serves to banish from our discourse any questions about redesigning
social institutions simply to make the poor more content with their
plight). The assumption that each individual acts to maximize his or
her own welfare is needed to keep our focus on the question of re-
forming institutions, as opposed to re-educating people.
If we assumed instead that some individual in society would
make personal choices that directly and systematically reduced his
own welfare in some institutional environment, then this individual's
loss of welfare could be blamed on his own dysfunctional behavior,
rather than on the structure of the social institution. That is, when we
find that irrational individuals would come to grief in some institu-
tional structure, we cannot say whether our finding is an argument for
reform of the institution or an argument for better education of indi-
viduals. Thus economists have found it useful to assume perfect ra-
tionality of individuals' behavior, in order to see more clearly when
social institutions have flaws that should be solved by institutional re-
form. The new role for economic analysis in political science has
arisen because of the failure of other theoretical approaches to pro-
vide such a framework for evaluating proposals to reform political in-
stitutions.
Our economic methodology for studying political institutions is
to represent them as simplified games where the preferences of all
political actors (politicians and voters) are precisely specified. Then
we look for rational equilibria in which each individual is choosing the
alternative among his or her feasible strategies that is best for his or
her own welfare, given the predicted behavior of all other individuals.
A proposed reform of a political institution would then correspond to
a change in the rules of this political game, which could in turn change
rational equilibrium behavior in the game. If the equilibrium out-
comes are better under the new game than the old game, then our
model has provided support for the proposed reform. Of course, no
single simplified model can definitively prove the desirability of any
proposed reform, which may have both good and bad consequences.
But if I favor some reform and you oppose it, we should each be able
to clarify the logic of our opinions by formulating some game model
in which the welfare consequences of the proposed reform would go
in the direction that we claim.
More generally, the role of theoretical researchers in political
economics is to develop new game models that can be used to evalu-
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ate constitutional structures, where these game models may differ
greatly in the assumptions that they make about the government's
policy options, the voters' preferences over these policies, and politi-
cians' preferences over political outcomes. The best game models are
those that, with reasonable assumptions, can account for significant
differences of observed political behavior that have been found with
different democratic structures in the political histories of various
countries. In this way, the development of political economics must be
guided by the empirical study of institutional comparative politics.
The main point of this part has been to argue that the analytic
methods of modem economics ought to be in the toolkit of any social
or political theorist who wants to think seriously about the practical
questions of institutional structure. In his companion essay, Professor
Herzog has indicated basic agreement with this proposition.'2 1 in turn
can also agree with Professor Herzog's insistence that a good political
theorist needs much more than just a technical command of these
analytical methods.3 To evaluate the quality and value of analytic
models of politics, a theorist also needs broad empirical knowledge of
political history and detailed familiarity with political institutions.
III. SOME FUNDAMENTAL INSIGHTS FROM PoLrnIcAL ECONOMICS
Cooter's introduction to political economics begins (in Chapters
2 and 3) by emphasizing three simple models: one model where the set
of possible government policies is one-dimensional, a second model
where the set of possible government policies is multidimensional, and
a third where voters can negotiate side payments to consolidate a po-
litical consensus. With these models, he nicely introduces the student
to three of the fundamental insights of political economics: the median
voter theorem in one dimension, the potential instability of majority
rule in multiple dimensions, and the Coase theorem. The median voter
theorem tells us that if the set of all policy alternatives has a simple
one-dimensional structure, then the results of majority rule should be
to select a government policy that is most preferred by a centrist
voter. The multidimensional instability theorem tells us that if the set
of policy alternatives does not have a simple one-dimensional struc-
ture, then the results of majority rule may be very unpredictable, be-
cause any alternative can be beaten by a majority that would favor
some other alternative. The Coase theorem predicts that, if bargaining
is costless and unanimous consent is required to make a change, then
the stable equilibrium outcomes should be efficient government poli-
12 Id at 906.
13 Id.
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cies (which means, when monetary side payments are possible, policies
which maximize the sum of everybody's payoffs).
The happy conclusion of the Coase theorem leads Cooter and
Mueller to emphasize the benefits of using unanimous consent as a
criterion for political decisionmaking whenever practical. The authors
do not neglect the practical difficulty of unanimous consent in large
groups, where it encourages individuals to exaggerate their costs of
consenting, so as to extract a bigger side payment for joining the coali-
tion. But this free rider problem has been extensively studied by in-
formation economists, who have recognized that the bargaining costs
which are assumed away in the Coase theorem can include unavoid-
able communication-incentive costs that are caused by people's uncer-
tainty about others' payoffs from various policy alternatives." It would
be good to see such incentive-constraint analysis introduced in these
books, at least at some elementary level.
Cooter and Mueller both emphasize the problem of excess de-
mand for local public goods when legislators are elected to represent
different regions or different subgroups of society. If a new road
would in Illinois yield benefits worth $2 to everyone in Illinois and
could be built by a tax that costs everyone in America $1, then we in
Illinois would like our representatives in the national government to
advocate this road for us. When the legislature is controlled by a coali-
tion which includes representatives of only 51 percent of the nation's
voters, the legislators in this coalition may rationally vote for public
goods that benefit their constituents without taking account of the tax
burden that these local public goods will impose on the other 49 per-
cent of the nation. The authors advocate mitigating this problem by
devolving decisions about local public goods to local and regional
governments whenever possible.
The difficulty, however, is that there is no higher power to prevent
the national government from buying local public goods with national
tax revenues. Similarly, when Mueller (pp 268-71) advocates constitu-
tional limitations that prohibit national government leaders from re-
sponding to citizens' demands for expenditure increases and tax re-
ductions, we should ask who would enforce such a paper prohibition
against popular actions by high government officials. A basic Madiso-
nian axiom is that constitutional limits on the powers of high govern-
ment leaders can ultimately be enforced only by other leaders or by
the voters at large. (Thinking along these lines, if we really want some
way of enforcing limits on excessive deficit spending by a Congress,
then we might want to consider a constitutional right for any Congress
14 Rafael Rob, Pollution Claim Settlements under Private Information, 47 J Econ Theory
307, 308 (1989).
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to repudiate excessive debts that were incurred by a previous Con-
gress.)
The distortions caused by strategic representation can be much
deeper even than Cooter and Mueller recognize. Once we understand
that a majority coalition in the legislature will tend to ignore the in-
terests of groups whose representatives are not in the coalition, we
find a strong incentive for groups to elect a representative who is
more likely to be invited into the governing coalition. Sometimes this
incentive may lead a bloc of voters to elect a representative who will
express preferences over government policies that are a systematic
distortion of the actual preferences of the voters in the bloc." For an
example in Israeli politics, if the large leftist and rightist parties that
are most likely to lead a governing coalition differ mainly on a big
question of land-for-peace, then voters in a small religious bloc might
want to elect representatives who are neutral on this big question,
even when the voters in the bloc actually prefer the rightist position in
the big question, because such neutrality may give the religious bloc's
representatives a higher probability of being included in a coalition
headed by either large party.
Austen-Smith and Banks ' used a rather different model, but
again taking account of voters' concerns about which party is most
likely to form a governing coalition in a multiparty democracy, to ex-
plain how a small centrist party could persistently hover at the thresh-
old of extinction in a proportional-representation parliament (as hap-
pened to the Free Democrats in Germany for many years) even when
a majority of voters would actually prefer its policy positions. The
problem highlighted in this model is that voters care most of all about
which party gets the largest number of seats in the parliament, be-
cause the largest party is assumed to get the first chance of forming a
government, and so a voter may rationally vote for a large leftist or
rightist party even when the voter would actually prefer to have the
small centrist party lead the government. In this scenario, the expecta-
tion that this centrist party will get only a small number of seats be-
comes a self-fulfilling prophecy. This model of Austen-Smith and
Banks also explains why the two large parties in Israel lost seats in
1994 when a constitutional reform there cut the link between being
the largest single party and getting the first chance to form a govern-
ment. Unfortunately, neither Cooter nor Mueller makes any reference
to this work of Austen-Smith and Banks.
15 V.V. Chaxi, Larry E. Jones, and Ramon Marimon, The Economics of Split Ticket Voting in
Representative Democracies, 87 Am Econ Rev 957,967 (1997).
16 David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey Banks, Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes,
82 Am Pol Sci Rev 405 (1988).
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Once we admit that elected representatives may have systemati-
cally different preferences from the voters who elected them, we are
ready for the questions of corruption and abuse of power by political
leaders. The liberal tradition of political philosophy"' has always un-
derstood that a fundamental goal of democracy is to counteract the
natural tendency for political leaders to use the great powers of gov-
ernment for their own benefit. To study this problem from the per-
spective of political economics, we should consider models where poli-
ticians have choices about how much to take for personal use from the
public treasury if elected to a high government office. It is rather sur-
prising that such models of selfish behavior by political leaders have
been almost completely neglected in political economics texts like
Cooter's and Mueller's. To assume that political leaders cannot try to
profit at the expense of the voters who elected them is like assuming
that producers in the marketplace cannot try to take profits from
selling to their customers.
Economists since Adam Smith have argued that, even when each
producer wants to maximize his profits, competition in a free market
may deter producers from charging high prices and taking large prof-
its in equilibrium. Economists now understand that competition can
have this profit-reducing effect, but only with certain kinds of market
structures. Similarly, one of the virtues of democracy is supposed to be
that competition among political leaders might deter them from op-
pressive abuse of power, but there is no reason to believe that this ef-
fect will occur with equal effectiveness under any democratic struc-
ture." In this regard, the logic of the Coase theorem comes back to
haunt us when it is applied in the circle of political leaders, with voters
left out in the cold. That is, when the political leaders of all parties
meet and negotiate in the halls of government, they may find that
their total personal payoffs would be maximized by a collusive agree-
ment to tolerate each other's corrupt exploitation of the tax-paying
public. How such a collusive understanding among political leaders
could be prevented is a fundamental question that should get serious
consideration in any theory of democracy.
Collusive understandings among producers to raise prices in a
market can be undermined when new producers enter the market,
hoping to take a share of the profits, with the result that production
expands and prices drop. So economists understand that the key struc-
tural feature that determines whether high collusive profits can be
maintained in a market may be the existence of barriers to entry that
17 Wflliam H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (Freeman 1982).
18 Myerson, 43 Eur Econ Rev at 684-91 (cited in note 5); Roger B. Myerson, Effectiveness
of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis, 5 Games
& Econ Behavior 118 (1993).
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prevent new producers from entering the market. Political economists
should similarly recognize the potential importance of barriers to en-
try in democratic competition. That is, the liberal success of democracy
in deterring politicians from profit-taking and abuse of power may
depend on lowering the barriers against new entrants into the political
game.
From this perspective, the tendency of plurality voting to inhibit
the creation of more than two serious parties looks like an electoral
barrier to entry, which could be lowered by changing to proportional
representation.'9 Autonomy of local and regional governments can
also serve as a way of lowering barriers to entry into national politics,
because politicians who develop reputations for good government at
local levels can grow into new challengers for national leadership. At a
more fundamental level, the vital importance of free speech in a de-
mocracy can be understood as a way of preventing barriers to entry
against new political organizations, because government regulation of
public speech could be used to make the creation of new political or-
ganizations very difficult. In contrast, Cooter's derivation of free
speech as a device to compensate for externalities that cause ineffi-
cient underproduction of ideas (in Chapter 13) seems to me rather off
the mark.
An important area of research in economic theory has been to
understand how the structure of markets may determine the number
and optimal internal structure of firms that compete in these markets.
Similarly, an important problem for political economics should be to
understand how the structure of a democracy may determine the
number of parties and the internal structure of parties. It has been ob-
served that the number of parties may depend critically on the elec-
toral system, being larger with proportional representation and
smaller with plurality voting. On the other hand, the internal coher-
ence of a party is often greater in parliamentary systems than presi-
dential systems.
Such differences in party discipline across presidential and par-
liamentary systems can be understood as an application of agency
theory in political economics. Unfortunately, agency theory is treated
only lightly by Cooter and generally ignored by Mueller. But we may
think of a political party as a collection of politicians, each of whom
has a natural incentive to independently free ride on the combined ef-
forts of all the other politicians in the party. To encourage politicians
to work together for the good of their party, loyal service has to be
rewarded in some way. In such dynamic moral hazard problems, an
optimal incentive system often involves holding back substantial re-
19 Myerson, 43 Eur Econ Rev at 686-87 (cited in note 5).
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wards until late in an agent's career, to reduce the threat of agents
quitting to join another competitor in mid-career. On the other hand,
because political parties are trying to convince voters that their or-
ganizational function is to deliver policy services and not to steal from
the treasury, a political party cannot openly reward its leading agents
with large monetary payments in the way that a commercial firm
would do. Instead a political party naturally uses the valuable assets
that it earns when it is successful, namely positions of power, as its cur-
rency for internal rewards. Thus, we can readily understand the prac-
tice of assigning cabinet positions as rewards for long-term party
service that is regularly observed in parliamentary systems.0
Such a system for party discipline would be undermined, how-
ever, if junior party loyalists could not trust senior leaders to pay out
the expected patronage rewards in due course. When a party gets con-
trol of the government under a parliamentary system, the junior
members of the party in power can turn out their leaders at any time
if their expectations are violated, and so the patronage system can be
enforced. But when a party gets control of the government under a
presidential system, the secure elected position of the president makes
him relatively invulnerable to such threats from his junior colleagues.
To the extent that a sitting president needs support from legislators to
pass his legislation, he may be tempted to look for this support from
all legislators, and not merely from the members of his own party. So
the system of rewards for party discipline may not be as effectively
implemented in a presidential system, and the result may be incoher-
ent parties that make the choices for voters much less clear in a presi-
dential system.
At a critical point in his development of an ideal proportional
representation system, Mueller considers the danger of coalitional in-
stability and unpredictability in a multiparty parliamentary system
and suggests that "[t]he solution ... could be accomplished by simply
separating the legislative and executive functions" (p 110). But this
suggestion ignores the tendency of the separation of powers in a
presidential system to decrease internal coherence of parties. As
Mueller himself later acknowledges (p 336 n 15), other political scien-
tists have argued that presidentialism with proportional representa-
tion may be a particularly dysfunctional combination
2
'
A major theme in Cooter's book is the optimal division of powers
to different levels of government. He introduces a simple agency
20 Michael Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds, Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Gov-
ernment (Cambridge 1994); Michael Laver and Norman Schofield, Multiparty Government: The
Politics of Coalition in Europe (Oxford 1990).
21 Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies 78-81 (Notre
Dame 1995); Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies at 102-03 (cited in note 3).
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model in this regard, but it seems rather superficial. For a contrast in
the literature, consider the more interesting agency example of Gilli-
gan and Krehbieln whose model is designed to show why centrist
leaders of a legislative chamber might rationally delegate proposal
power to a committee of relative extremists (because the extremists'
different preferences would make them more willing to exert costly
efforts to gather information). More interesting examples of agency
problems could also be designed to shed light on the questions of op-
timal separation of powers in government.
For example, to illustrate the fundamental importance of sepa-
rating powers along lines of separate accountability, suppose that an
important observable outcome of government (like the inflation rate)
depends on the efforts and the skill of two different elected officials,
but the voters cannot directly monitor these officials' separate activi-
ties that influence this outcome. Suppose also that the politicians A
and B who currently hold these two offices are political rivals, ex-
pected to run against each other in the near future, but A's office is
more powerful and so has more effect on the observable outcome.
Then voters should assume that the observed outcome is more an in-
dication of the skills and efforts of politician A. In this situation, poli-
tician B may have an incentive to use his power counterproductively,
in hope of generating a bad outcome that would make A look inept to
the voters. If the voters anticipate such secret sabotage by B, then B's
incentive to sabotage becomes even stronger, because the voters could
rationally infer from a bad outcome that B is a particularly capable
manipulator of government who would be a more effective leader in a
higher office.
IV. TEXTBOOKS FORA NEWFIELD
My discussion may make clear that many of my favorite ques-
tions and models in political economics are not well represented in
Mueller's and Cooter's books. I would prefer to see more emphasis on
problems of abuse of power by politicians, strategic misrepresentation
by voters, and fully integrated models of competitive elections and
post-election bargaining like the model of Austen-Smith and Banks. 2
On the empirical side, I would have hoped that the findings of great
recent works of institutional comparative politics like Taagepera and
Shugart4 and Shugart and Careyn would have been cited and dis-
cussed at length in such textbooks.
22 Thomas W. Giligan and Keith Krehbiel, Organization of Informative Committees by a
Rational Legislature, 34 Am J Pol Sci 531 (1990).
23 Austen-Smith and Banks, 82 Am Pol Sci Rev at 410-14 (cited in note 16).
24 Taagepera and Shugart, Seats and Votes (cited in note 2).
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But my critical reaction is probably a sign of how rapidly the field
of political economics is developing, which leaves us far from any
common agreement about what should be the main topics in a basic
textbook. I am sure that, if I could write my own ideal textbook to-
morrow, Mueller and Cooter would each find serious gaps in it. We
should applaud Mueller and Cooter as pioneers who have bravely
made the first efforts to organize this territory into chapters of a text-
book.
In the ambitious broad scope and organizational structure of
their books, Mueller and Cooter are indeed taking a great step for-
ward. In the recent past, general textbooks on comparative politics
have typically been organized into regionally-focused chapters with ti-
tles like "Politics in Japan" and "Politics in Mexico" (for example, Al-
mond and Powell 6). You have to go back to old classics like Friedrich7
if you want to find a general comparative-politics textbook that has
chapter titles like "Federalism, .... Electoral Systems," and "Delibera-
tive Assemblies," where each chapter focuses on one structural com-
ponent of the constitutional system, and each chapter uses the com-
parative experiences of various countries under different constitu-
tional systems to sharpen our questions and intuitions about this
structural component. It is good to see Mueller and Cooter leading the
return to textbooks organized along such.structural lines. We should
look forward to further efforts to merge the broad institutional per-
spective of Friedrich with the newer game theoretic tools of economic
analysis, and with the new empirical analysis of scholars like Shugart
and Carey.
Mueller and Cooter should also succeed in stimulating discussion
with their specific proposals about good political structures. We may
not agree with all the conclusions that they advocate about the desir-
ability of specific structural reforms. But asking students to study
these arguments and then to formulate opposing arguments about the
possible disadvantages of these proposed reforms may also be a very
good way to teach students how to analyze political institutions.
The rapid theoretical evolution of political economics will con-
tinue with other books following after Mueller and Cooter. Other re-
cent and forthcoming textbooks in this area include Shepsle and Bon
25 Shugart and Carey, Presidents and Assemblies (cited in note 3).
26 See, for example, Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics
Today:A World View (Scott, Foresman 4th ed 1988).
27 Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in
Europe and America (Ginn revised ed 1964).
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chek,2 Austen-Smith and Banks,29 and Persson and Tabellini.n Each of
these books emphasizes quite different aspects of the analysis of po-
litical institutions. Synthesizing the best from these differing perspec-
tives should be a task of the greatest importance for economists and
political scientists in the coming years. The result will be a new and
broader understanding of political institutions that can offer better
guidance in the great debates of democratic reforms and may thus im-
prove the prospects for the successful spread of democracy through-
out the world.
Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark S. Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and
Institutions (Norton 1997). -
29 David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, 2 Positive Political Theory (forthcoming
Michigan 2001); David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, 1 Positive Political Theory: Collective
Preference (Michigan 1999).
30 T. Persson and G. Tabellini, Political Economics (forthcoming MIT 2000).
